REPRESENTING THE CHILD-CLIENT: KIDS ARE PEOPLE TOO by Lurie, Angela D.
NYLS Journal of Human Rights 
Volume 11 Issue 1 Article 6 
Fall 1993 
REPRESENTING THE CHILD-CLIENT: KIDS ARE PEOPLE TOO 
Angela D. Lurie 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lurie, Angela D. (1993) "REPRESENTING THE CHILD-CLIENT: KIDS ARE PEOPLE TOO," NYLS Journal of 
Human Rights: Vol. 11 : Iss. 1 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights/vol11/iss1/6 
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in NYLS Journal of Human Rights by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
REPRESENTING THE CI-LD-CLIENT:
KIDS ARE PEOPLE TOO
An Analysis of the Role of Legal
Counsel to a Minor
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court recognized the right
of an accused juvenile delinquent to independent counsel.' Since that
time, the right to counsel has been extended to children in abuse and
neglect proceedings,2 parental rights termination cases,3 custody
actions,4 and a host of other proceedings.5 Commentators have even
suggested that a child has a constitutional right to counsel in any case
in which that child has an interest.6
With so much litigation involving minors reaching the courts,
one question has repeatedly surfaced: What is the proper role of an
0 Copyright 1993 by the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights.
' In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4 (1966). In this case, the Court reversed the denial of
a habeas corpus petition of a 15 year old boy charged with making lewd telephone calls.
This reversal was based on due process grounds, including the child's lack of notice of
his right to counsel. Id. at 41, 42.
2 Almost every state now statutorily guarantees children the right to appointed
counsel in abuse and neglect proceedings. Howard A. Davidson, The Child's Right to
be Heard and Represented in Judicial Proceedings, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 255, 268 (1991).
' In re Orlando F., 351 N.E.2d 711, 717 (N.Y. 1976) (extending the right to a law
guardian to children facing permanent termination of parental rights).
4 27 states now have provisions for lawyers or guardians to represent the rights of
a child in a custody dispute. Jan Hoffman, When a Child-Client Disagrees With the
Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1992, at B6.
I Other proceedings in which children have had counsel appointed include: mental
hospital commitments, foster care decisions, paternity proceedings, and actions to compel
medical treatment or education. See James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation
for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 565, 570-81 (1976) (discussing proceedings in which counsel
for juveniles has been suggested).
' Martin Guggenheim, The Right to Be Represented But Not Heard.: Reflections on
Legal Representationfor Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 77 (1984) (citing Monroe L.
Inker & Charlotte A. Perretta, A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 5 FAM.
L.Q. 108, 113 (1971)); see Paul K. Milmed, Due Process for Children: A Right to
Counsel in Custody Proceedings, 4 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 177 (1974)).
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attorney representing a minor?7 No other issue in family or juvenile
court practice has generated more extensive discussion, disagreement,
and debate.' The Supreme Court has yet to address this issue,9 and
a quarter century of litigation in lower courts has not produced a
clear mandate for any particular role.
In light of this uncertainty about an attorney's proper role,
this Note examines the four most common roles that have been
proposed: the "champion" for the child's best interests; 0 the
'This note focuses on the role of the attorney who has been appointed as
independent counsel to a minor. This role is arguably different than the role of an
attorney appointed as a child's guardian ad litem. A guardian ad litem, who may not
be an attorney, has a clearly defined statutory role in most states: to further a child's
best interests. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.045 (West 1991). In the majority of
proceedings this note is concerned with, the parent has an interest in conflict with that
of the minor. The child's parents are therefore disqualified from their normal roles as
substitute decisionmakers for the child. See generally Dennis Cline, Speaking for the
Child.- The Role of the Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 CAL. L. REv. 681, 684-85
(1987) (stating that if a conflict of interest arises within a family, the presumption of
parental decision making can be rebutted). In this situation, the state steps in under the
doctrine of parens patriae to protect the child. Id. Parens patriae literally means
"parent of the country" and traditionally refers to the states' role as sovereign and
guardian of persons under legal disability. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440
F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1971).
s N.Y. FAm. CT. AcT § 241 cmt. at 181 (McKinney 1992).
9 Although the Supreme Court has never rendered a decision on point, an analysis
of decisions dealing with the rights of juveniles may give some indication as to how the
Court may eventually hold on the issue of an attorney's proper role in representing a
child-client. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1966) (expressing reservations
about the adoption of a non-adversarial approach in juvenile court based on the belief
that without following due process, the juvenile may feel that he is not being treated
fairly and may resist rehabilitation); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 242 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (supporting the proposition that if a mature child's
interests conflict with the interests of his parents, the child should be permitted to
express his views); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (reflecting a paternalistic
approach of limiting the freedom of children to choose for themselves that could be read
to indicate that the court might favor the protective role of defender of the child's best
interests).
"0 Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 100. Professor Guggenheim uses the term
"champion" to refer to an attorney who sees her duty as defending her child-client's best
interests. The word "champion" originally comes from Justice Brennan's opinion in
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 638 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). ("Children incarcerated in public mental institutions are
constitutionally entitled to a fair opportunity to contest the legitimacy of their
confinement. They are entitled to some champion who can speak on their behalf and
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traditional advocate for the child's wishes;11 the impartial investigator
who gathers all relevant information and presents it to the court; 2 and
the law guardian, someone who espouses a combination of all of the
above roles.1 This Note then analyzes the ethical obligations,
statutes, case law, and standards set by practitioners in light of the
responsibilities they impose on an attorney in her role as counsel to
a minor.
This Note concludes by advocating that the only ethically
proper role for an attorney assigned to a mature child as a law
guardian or legal counsel is that of an advocate for the child's
expressed wishes. If the child in question is too young to adequately
express a point of view, the attorney acting as a law guardian will
have to substitute her own view of what is best for the child. In
states where there is no statutory provision for a law guardian, an
attorney acting as legal counsel for an immature child should seek to
have a guardian ad litem appointed for the child. The attorney should
then advocate for her client's wishes as expressed by the child's
guardian.
L Possible Roles for an Attorney with a Child-Client
A. The "Champion"
In its earliest incarnation the juvenile court was a place where
there was little room for the strict legal defenses presented by an
attorney. 4 Juvenile court was looked at as a benevolent institution
designed to protect children accused of delinquency from the harsh
realities of an adult criminal court.1  The court focused on
rehabilitation, not guilt, and as such, an adversarial setting was
who stands ready to oppose a wrongful confinement."); see discussion infra part I.A.
" See infra part I.B.
12 See infra part I.C.
" See infra part I.D.
14 PAUL PIERSMA ET AL., LAW AND TACTICS IN JUVENILE CASES 46 (3d ed. 1977).
15 Id.
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thought to be inappropriate.16 Judges excluded attorneys from
proceedings in an attempt to protect the informality of the hearing and
to insure a disposition that would prove to be therapeutic to the
accused child.17
Abuses were bound to occur when there was no one to speak
for the accused child. In response, the Supreme Court prescribed the
right to counsel for children in proceedings in which commitment to
an institution was a possible outcome. " This guarantee of counsel
did not, however, guarantee that a child would be given an attorney
who would advocate his expressed wishes.
To this day, courts continue to serve the purpose of
adjudicating a child's best interests. 9 It is in this context that
practitioners and commentators have argued that an attorney's proper
role is to assist the court in achieving a resolution that is in the best
interests of the child.2" This role, it is argued, is reflective of the
unique features of the juvenile court system and the unique stature
of the client.22
Proponents of the "best interest" approach argue that while
conclusive weight should be given to an adult's decision, the same
deference need not be accorded to a child.23 Good lawyers under this
approach are ones that will "employ their wisdom to advise their
clients to seek what is best for the child in the long run, rather than
attempt to win a Pyrrhic victory and obtain for their clients what they
want but perhaps shouldn't have. "'
16 Richard Kay & Daniel Segal, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court
Proceedings: A Non-Polar Approach, 61 GEo. L.J. 1401, 1403 (1973).
17 PIERSMA ET AL., supra note 14.
'8 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1966).
'9 See Kay & Segal, supra note 16, at 1419.
2o Id. at 1403-04.
21 Kay & Segal, supra note 16, at 1401.
2 See id. at 1410 (distinguishing the attorney's proper role in representing an adult-
client versus a child-client).
Id. at 1411.
24 Paul W. Alexander, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Court, 46 A.B.A. J. 1206,
1209 (1960); see Lorna E. Lockwood, The Role of Counsel in Juvenile Proceedings, in
GAULT: WHAT NOW FOR THE JUVENILE COURT? 93, 100 (Virginia D. Nordin ed., 1968)
(stating an attorney should be concerned with the best interests of the child as opposed
to winning).
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Practical considerations may also call for an attorney to adopt
the "best interest" approach." Arguably, some juvenile courts still
operate in a manner similar to the pre-Gault era, when a juvenile had
no guarantee of counsel.26 In this type of atmosphere, a lawyer
taking a strict adversarial position may be unwelcome.27 By
appearing cooperative, an attorney may achieve a more favorable
disposition for her client.28
Critics argue that an attorney acting as a Champion has an
inordinate influence on legal proceedings.29 By deciding what a
child's best interests are, the Champion is in effect making legal
decisions that are properly in the province of the judiciary.3
B. The "Advocate"
Under the advocate approach, the role of an attorney
representing a child is no different from that of an attorney
representing an adult.31 The attorney acting in this role will advocate
the child's expressed wishes.3 2 This is not to say that the attorney
may not counsel a client that his decision is unwise.3 Under the
advocate approach, however, final decision making authority will
always rest with the client. 4
5 Kay & Segal, supra note 16, at 1413.
2 Id.
27 Id.
2 Id.; see WELIAM V. STAPELTON & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH
(1972) (studying two juvenile court systems, one operating on a structured adversarial
model, the other having a traditional outlook and style, and concluding that attorneys
working in the more traditional system act in a manner more accommodating to the
court).
" Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 135.
30 Id. at 138.
t See James P. Yudes, Children's Rights in the Emerging Reality, N.J. L.J., Nov.
23, 1992, at 15.
32 See id.
33 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE PONSIBILITY EC 7-28 (1980) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE].
See Yudes, supra note 31.
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Proponents of the advocate approach contend that an attorney
acting as an advocate is more likely to gain her client's trust."
Studies have shown that children trust their attorneys more when they
are given the opportunity to share in decisionmaking and when they
observe their attorneys taking an adversary stance. 6 Additionally, an
attorney who acts as an advocate preserves her ethical responsibility
to her client" and ensures that her client's voice will be heard in
court.
C. The "Impartial Investigator"
Unlike the two previous approaches, the attorney who
assumes the role of the impartial investigator will not explicitly
advocate a particular outcome.38 The attorney will investigate all
relevant facts and legal issues and inform the court of any
information not conveyed by other parties. 9 A lawyer in this context
is, in effect, an arm of the court. It is her duty to remain neutral and
assist the court in achieving a proper disposition of the case.
While it is difficult to argue that someone whose purpose is
to bring the truth before the court serves no use, as one commentator
pointed out, an attorney fulfilling this role is "no more an attorney
for the child than a district attorney's homicide investigator is an
attorney for the deceased. "40 When courts and commentators propose
that an attorney should assume the role of an investigator they are in
fact proposing a new form of court ordered discovery; they are not,
however, giving a child legal representation as we have come to
recognize it in our adversarial system. 4'
3 PIERSMA ET AL., supra note 14, at 51; see Project-The Lawyer-Child
Relationship: A Statistical Analysis, 9 DUQ. L. REV. 627, 642 (1971) (study conducted
in Pittsburgh in 1971 found that 30% of the juveniles interviewed did not tell their
lawyers the entire story).
PIERSMA ET AL., supra note 14, at 51.
7 See infra part II.A.
Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 107.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 108.
41 Id.
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Thus, a major problem with this role is that by not
performing the traditional duties of an attorney, an impartial
investigator is arguably acting in a manner that conflicts with her
ethical duty to act as a zealous advocate for her client. 42
Additionally, the attorney who acts as an investigator may undermine
legitimate parental interests in privacy and autonomy in her quest to
uncover all relevant facts.
4
D. The "Law Guardian"
The attorney who acts as a law guardian has a dual role. As
the name itself implies, the law guardian is part advocate and part
guardian. She has perhaps the most difficult job of all because she
has a statutory mandate to represent both a child's interests and
wishes.'
In New York, where the law guardian role is prescribed by
statute, there has been substantial controversy over just how the law
guardian is to put this role into effect.45
IL Ethical Obligations Facing the Attorney with a Child-Client
A. Professional Responsibility Standards
An attorney looking to clarify her obligations to a minor as
a court appointed attorney should always refer to professional
responsibility standards. Here she will find instruction as to her
ethical duties to her client. The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility suggests that counsel's proper function is to enable
individual litigants to enforce, protect, and preserve their own legal
rights.46 Canon 7 of the Model Code requires a lawyer to represent
42 See MODEL CODE, supra note 33, at EC 7-1.
' Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 109. This type of infringement is most likely to
occur in divorce-custody and child protective proceedings. Id.
"See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 241 (McKinney 1992) (emphasis added).
45 See infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
46 See MODEL CODE, supra note 33.
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her client zealously within the bounds of the law.47 An attorney must
diligently study the facts of the case, thoroughly research the law,
and present both to the tribunal in an adversarial manner.48 While it
is a lawyer's duty to inform her client of all relevant considerations,49
the Code cautions that "the authority to make decisions is exclusively
that of the client, and if made within the framework of the law such
decisions are binding on his lawyer."5 Disciplinary Rule 7-101
proscribes a lawyer from intentionally failing to seek the lawful
objectives of her client."
This would seem to indicate that an attorney has an
unconditional obligation to defend the wishes of her client. However,
the Code acknowledges that with certain clients this obligation may
not be absolute.52 Ethical Canon 7-12 informs an attorney that she
may be compelled in court proceedings to make decisions for her
client if the client is under a mental or physical disability that
prevents the client from making a "considered judgment."" The
Code cautions that if the client is capable of understanding the matter
in question, an attorney must obtain all possible aid from the client.5'
While the Code pronounces that a client's right to direct the
course of litigation depends on the client's ability to make a
considered judgment, it does not define "considered judgment," and
as such, the attorney is left without a complete answer. 55 However,
if one accepts the proposition that a mature child, though not legally
of age, is nonetheless capable of "considered judgment," then
according to the Model Code, the attorney is ethically bound to
advocate this child's views.56 As one commentator recently noted,
"there is nothing in the . canons which permit[s] the attorney to
' Id. at Canon 7.
4' Id. at EC 7-19.
49 Id. at EC 7-8.
" Id. at EC 7-7.
51 MODELS CODE, supra note 33, at EC 7-7.
12 Id. at EC 7-12.
5' Id. While the Model Code never defines "considered judgment," other sources
have defined it as being mature enough to understand, with advice of counsel, at least
the general nature of the proceedings. See infra note 65, at 81.
'4 MODEL CODE, supra note 33, at EC 7-12.
5 See id.
5 See id.
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substitute [her] opinion for that of the [mature] child client or to
compromise the zealous client directed advocacy mandated by the
Code.
5 7
In the case of the younger child who is not capable of
considered judgment but is capable of understanding and contributing,
the Code clearly states that an attorney has an obligation to consult
with and obtain all possible aid from this child in making decisions.5"
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct offer similar
guidance to the attorney with regard to her duties to a child-client.
Rule 1.14 instructs an attorney that when a client's ability to make
"considered decisions" about the case is impaired for reasons such as
minority, the lawyer should, as far as reasonably possible, maintain
a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.59 Comment 1
does caution however, that it might not always be possible to
maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship in all respects.' This
comment goes on to advise attorneys that clients lacking legal
competence often are still capable of understanding, deliberating
upon, and reaching conclusions about matters affecting their own
well-being.61 Specifically, the comment states that "children as young
as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are
regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal
proceedings concerning their custody. "'62 Thus, under the Model
Rules, a lawyer is obligated to maintain a normal lawyer-client
relationship with a minor who is capable of making "considered
decisions. "63 "Considered decisions" would appear to be the
equivalent of the Model Code's "considered judgment" test. Also,
like the Model Code, the Model Rules advise that an attorney should
seek the input of even a young child." 4
"' Merril Sobie, Representing Child Clients: Role of Counsel or Law Guardian, N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 6, 1992, at 2.
g MODEL CODE, supra note 33, at EC 7-12.
59 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 1.14 (1983).
' Id. at cmt. 1.
61 Id.
6' Id.
6 MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 (1983).
6 Id.
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B. ABA and State Bar Standards
In 1980, a joint commission of the Institute for Judicial
Administration (UA) and the American Bar Association (ABA) issued
a compilation of standards for attorneys practicing in the field of
juvenile law.65 The commission took the position that when an
attorney has a child client of sufficient maturity, the attorney should
be bound to defend what the child determines to be his own
interests.' 6 "Although counsel may strongly feel that the client's
choice of posture is unwise, and perhaps be right in that opinion, the
lawyer's view may not be substituted for that of a client who is
capable of considered judgment .... "67 The standard for considered
judgment, according to the commission, is that of a child who is
"mature enough to understand, with advice of counsel, at least the
general nature of the proceedings, the acts with which he or she has
been charged, and the consequences associated with the pending
action. "68
The IJA-ABA standards deal with various types of common
juvenile proceedings individually.69 Counsel in a delinquency or
person-in-need-of-supervision proceeding should ordinarily be bound
to defend her client's wishes with regard to the admission or denial
of the facts or alleged conditions.7" The attorney does however, have
a duty to advise her client on the probable success or consequences
of these actions.7" In a child protective proceeding, a child capable
of "considered judgment," should have the ultimate responsibility for
determining his own interests.72
In a delinquency, person-in-need-of-supervision, or child
protective proceeding involving a child of a young age, the IJA-ABA
INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOINT
COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES (1980)
[hereinafter IJA-ABA STANDARDS].
66 See id. § 3.1(b) at 76-77.
'7 Id. at 81 cmt.
6"Id.
" This section of the IJA-ABA Standards does not distinguish between the different
stages of the various proceedings it discusses. See supra note 65.
70 IJA-ABA STANDARDS, supra note 65, at § 3.1(b)(ii)[a].
71 Id.
72 Id. at § 3.1(b)(ii)[b].
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Standards caution that the child may not be capable of a "considered
judgment" on his own behalf.73 When this is the case, a guardian ad
litem is recommended.74 If a child has a guardian ad litem, the
attorney should look to the guardian and to the child to determine the
best position to take.75 If a child does not have a guardian ad litem,
the attorney should request that one, other than herself, be
appointed.76 In cases where a guardian has not been appointed, and
it appears for whatever reason that some type of independent advice
will not be available to the child, counsel should consider all facts
and circumstances that the child would consider.77 After consulting
with the child and the child's family, if their interests are not adverse
to those of the child, the attorney may remain neutral and limit her
role in the proceedings to the presentation of evidence.7" If
necessary, the attorney may adopt the position that would, based upon
the circumstances, result in the least intrusive invasion upon the
child.79
Like the ABA, several state bar associations have issued their
own standards for attorneys practicing in the field of juvenile law.
For example, the New York State Bar Association Committee on
Juvenile Justice and Child Welfare has issued its own standards for
law guardians 0 representing minors. 1 In juvenile delinquency and
persons-in-need-of-supervision proceedings, these standards
encourage attorneys representing a child to work with the child in
7' Id. at § 3.1(b)(ii)[c].
71 See id. at § 3.1(b)(ii)[1], [2], and [31.
75 IJA-ABA STANDARDS, supra note 65, at § 3.1(b)(ii)[c][1].
76 Id. at § 3.1(b)(ii)[c][2]. This recommendation would be at odds with the approach
taken in New York and other states where a law guardian is appointed to represent a
child in many juvenile proceedings. A law guardian, in this situation, serves as both
legal counsel and as a guardian. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
77 IJA-ABA STANDARDS, supra note 65, at § 3.1(b)(ii)[c][3].
7 Id.
79 Id.
50 See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
81 LAW GUARDIAN REPRESENTATION STANDARDS (New York State Bar Association
Committee on Juvenile Justice and Child Welfare 1988) [hereinafter 1988 LAW
GUARDIAN STANDARDS]; LAW GUARDIAN REPRESENTATION STANDARDS VOLUME II:
CUSTODY CASES (New York State Bar Association Committee on Juvenile Justice and
Child Welfare 1992) [hereinafter 1992 LAW GUARDIAN STANDARDS].
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developing a position and strategy. 2 An attorney is further advised
to ascertain the desires of the child, advise the child of potential
alternatives, and get the child's full consent to the specific position
the attorney intends to argue.83 In addition, the attorney should
always advocate the "least possible restrictive dispositional
alternative" which can be supported and presented.' 4
In child protective, termination of parental rights, or foster
care placement and review proceedings, the New York Bar
Association urges a different approach for law guardians representing
children.85 The assumption in these cases is that, unlike the majority
of juvenile delinquent and persons-in-need-of-supervision
proceedings, a child involved in one of these proceedings may be
very young.86 The law guardian here is referred to her statutory
function of articulating the wishes and protecting the interests of the
child.87 The standards caution that "[t]he mixture of wishes and
interests depends in large part on the child's age, maturity, and
capacity."88 The law guardian is warned that there may be an
intrinsic conflict between the child's wishes, which should be
advocated, and the child's interests and well-being.89 This conflict
82 1988 LAw GUARDIAN STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 36 (Standard D-9), 98
(Standard C-9).
11 Id. at 51 (Standard F-7), 114 (Standard E-8)(emphasis added). This provision
requiring an attorney to obtain her client's consent to a specific disposition is similar to
the IJA-ABA requirement that an attorney in a delinquency or person-in-need-of-
supervision proceeding should ordinarily be bound to defend her client's wishes. See
supra text accompanying note 70.
8 1988 LAw GUARDIAN STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 53 (Standard G-1), 115
(Standard F-I).
sS Id. at 126, 155 (Standard D-1), 167, 193 (Standard D-1), 206, 230 (Standard B-5).
Id. at 125.
87 Id. at 126, 155 (Standard D-1), 167, 193 (Standard D-1), 206, 230 (Standard B-
5). The law guardian's statutory responsibilities are codified in the New York Family
Court Act. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
88 1988 LAW GUARDIAN STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 126, 167. This
recommendation is similar to the IJA-ABA's position that a child involved in a
protective proceeding who is determined to be capable of considered judgment should
have the ultimate responsibility for determining his interests. See supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
89 1988 LAw GUARDIAN STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 127, 167-68.
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should be resolved, to the extent possible by working closely with the
child. 9
In child custody matters, the New York Bar Association
advises an attorney to develop a strategy in conjunction with her
client. 9 If the child is old enough to articulate his desires and to
assist counsel, a plan should be developed with the child's
cooperation and agreement.' An older child's wishes should be
ascertained by testimony or interview at the trial stage. 93
III. Statutes Dealing with the Role an Attorney Should Play in
Representing a Child-Client
The attorney who turns to statutory law will find little, if any,
guidance in most states. Those states that address the subject offer
unclear or mixed messages. 94
An example of an unclear provision is found in § 40-4-205 of
the Montana Code which states that, "[t]he court may appoint an
attorney to represent the interests of a minor dependent child with
respect to [his] support, custody, and visitation . . . . , Though the
statute itself does not clarify whether the word "interests" refers to
the child's expressed interests, or what is determined to be his best
interests, the accompanying Commissioner's note states that, "[t]he
attorney is not a guardian ad litem for the child, but an advocate
whose role is to represent the child's interests. " While the word
"interests" is once again not clear, in comparing the role of the
attorney to that of the guardian ad litem (whose role is to represent
the child's best interests), this comment implies that the attorney's
90 Id. at 127, 168.
91 1992 LAw GUARDIAN STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 22 (Standard B-2).
91 Id. at 23.
SId. at 32.
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-205 (1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-116
(West 1992); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 241 (MeKinney 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.23
(West 1992); see also Robert M. Horowitz & Howard A. Davidson, Tough Decisions
for the Tender Years, 10 FAM. ADvoc. 9, 11 (1988).
9- MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-205 (1991) (emphasis added).
96 MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-205 Commissioner's note (1991).
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role differs from that of the guardian ad litem's, namely, to represent
the child's expressed wishes.
Case law in Montana supports a converse interpretation of the
word "interests" in § 40-4-205."' In 1985, the Montana Supreme
Court interpreted the word "interests" in this statute to mean a child's
"best interests" not a child's wishes.
98
In New York, the Family Court Act provides attorneys
seeking guidance with somewhat of a mixed message.99 In 1970, this
act was revised to say, "[tihis part establishes a system of law
guardians for minors who often require the assistance of counsel to
help protect their interests and to help them express their wishes to
the court. '""'i While there are those that believe that this provision
gives law guardians the flexibility necessary to carry out their jobs,"01
this statute has nonetheless provoked substantial controversy over the
specific role attorneys representing minors in New York should play
in various family court proceedings. 0 2 This statute, like the Montana
statute previously cited, does not clarify whether the word "interests"
refers to a child's expressed interests, or what is determined to be his
best interests.10 3 Additionally, nowhere in this statute is it stated
under what circumstances an attorney should help protect a child's
interests and under what circumstances an attorney should help a
child express his wishes.'04
Perhaps because of this ambiguity, courts in New York have
interpreted this statute in several ways: some have required an
attorney to represent a child's needs and wishes; 5 some have implied
'7 See In re Marriage of Rolfe, 699 P.2d 79, 86 (Mont. 1985).
9 Id.
99 See N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 241 (McKinney 1992).
100 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 241 (McKinney 1992) (emphasis added).
101 Interview with Laura Cohen, Assistant Director of Training, Juvenile Rights
Division, Legal Aid Society of New York in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 18, 1993).
'0' See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 241 cmt. (MeKinney 1992).
'03 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 241 (MeKinney 1992).
104 See id.
1o5 See In re Sandra "XX", 565 N.Y.S.2d 269, 271 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1991); In
re Dewey S., 573 N.Y.S.2d 769 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1991).
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that an attorney should represent a child's best interests;' °0 and some
have implied that an attorney has a duty to represent the views of any
child mature enough to adequately express an opinion.,07 One New
York court has found that an attorney has a duty to remain neutral. '08
Despite the apparent confusion this statute has caused in New
York courts, one commentator has taken the position that the statute
does offer attorneys a clearly defined mandate." ° The latter clause,
expressing the child's wishes to the court, is a straightforward
obligation to convey the child's expressed wishes to the court.1 0 The
former clause, helping to protect the child's interests, is borrowed
directly from the Model Code's Ethical Consideration 6-4 which
states that "[hiaving undertaken representation, a lawyer should use
proper care to safeguard the interests of his client." 11' In analyzing
the statute, this commentator argues that protecting interests and
safeguarding interests are synonymous, yet no one, when considering
the application of the above ethical rule, would consider suggesting
that an attorney independently determine a client's interests and act
accordingly. 1 2
In 1990, the New York State Legislature arguably clarified
the law guardian's role in the post-dispositional stage of child
protective proceedings by adding § 1075 to the Family Court Act:. 3
This statute effectively turns the law guardian into an auxiliary child
protective worker1 4 by requiring the guardian to "apply to the court
for appropriate relief" when she has "reasonable cause to suspect that
the child is at risk of further abuse or neglect or that there has been
" See In re Jennifer G., 487 N.Y.S.2d 864 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1985); In re Peter
"W", 565 N.Y.S.2d 271 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1991); In re Tina PP, 591 N.Y.S.2d 84
(App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992).
"o See In re Elianne M., 601 N.Y.S.2d 481 (App. Div. 1993); Fagnoli v. Farber,
481 N.Y.S.2d 784 (App. Div. 1984); P. v. P., N.Y. L.J., Nov. 10, 1992, at 29 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1992).
' See In re Apel, 409 N.Y.S.2d 928, 930 (Fain. Ct. 1978).
109 Sobie, supra note 57.
110 Id.
"I Id. (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-4 (1980)).
112 Id.
113 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1075 (McKinney 1992).
114 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 241 cmt. (MeKinney Supp. 1990).
A A
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a substantive violation of a court order.""' No mention is made of
the child's wishes in this section of the statute.
No corresponding indication of the role an attorney should
take at other stages of a child protective proceeding or in other types
of proceedings can be found in the Family Court Act. As a result,
the exact role of a law guardian in most proceedings remains largely
unclear under New York statutory law.
The Montana and New York statutes discussed above are
representative of other statutes that do nothing to clarify the role an
attorney with a child-client should play. The lack of clear definitions
of terms, and the failure to clearly distinguish between a child's
expressed interests and a child's best interests, leave attorneys and the
courts in a quandary. These statutes seem even more unclear when
contrasted with statutes that clearly define the role of a guardian ad
litem. 116
IV. Case Law Dealing with the Role an Attorney Should Play in
Representing a Child-Client
Some courts have directly addressed the issue of an attorney's
proper role in representing a minor. Those that have are divided
between two popular roles, the champion for the child's best interests
and the traditional advocate for the child's expressed wishes." 7
'"N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1075 (McKinney 1992).
"1 Chapter 767 of the Wisconsin Statutes Annotated describes the responsibilities of
the guardian ad litem as "an advocate for the best interests of a minor child as to legal
custody, physical placement and support. The guardian ad litem . . . shall consider,
but shall not be bound by, the wishes of the minor child or the positions of others as to
the best interests of the minor child." WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.045 (WEST 1991)
(emphasis added).
I7 For cases holding or implying that an attorney's proper role is to advocate a
child's best interests, see In re J.P.B., 419 N.W.2d 387 (Iowa 1988); In re Marriage of
Rolfe, 699 P.2d 79 (Mont. 1985); In re Barnthouse, 765 P.2d 610 (Colo. Ct. App.
1988); In re Marriage of Kramer, 580 P.2d 439 (Mont. 1978); In re Jennifer G., 487
N.Y.S.2d 864 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1985); In re Peter WV", 565 N.Y.S.2d 271 (App.
Div. 3d Dept. 1991); In re Tina "PP", 591 N.Y.S.2d 84 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992);
Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa
1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 640 (1979)). For examples of cases holding or implying that
an attorney's proper role is to act as an advocate for a child's expressed wishes, see
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There are also courts which have held that an attorney must advocate
both a child's needs and wishes,"' as well as courts that have held
that one person cannot fulfill both of these roles because of an
inherent conflict of interest.11 9 One court has stated that an attorney's
proper role is to remain a neutral assistant of the court. 2°
A. The "Champion": The Courts and The "Best Interests"
Approach
Several state and federal courts have held or implied that an
attorney's proper role is to defend a child's best interests in a variety
of proceedings. 21 In a termination of parental rights proceeding, the
Iowa Supreme Court found that the traditional lawyer-client
relationship should be modified when the client is a child.' The
attorney's proper role is to advocate a child's best interests, not a
child's wishes. 2 ' In this case, the two children involved, who were
nine and thirteen years old, expressed their opinions. However, the
court stated that the very nature of the proceeding implied that the
Haziel v. United States, 404 F.2D 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Fagnoli v. Farber, 481
N.Y.S.2d 784 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1984); P. v. P., N.Y. L.J., Nov.10, 1992, at 29
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1992); In re Elianne M. 601 N.Y.S.2d 481 (App. Div. 1993);
Rob Karwath, Girl Raped By Stepdad Granted New Lawyer, Cii. TRM., Sep. 5, 1992,
at 5.
"' See In re Sandra "XX", 565 N.Y.S.2d 269, 271 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1991); In
re Dewey S., 573 N.Y.S.2d 769 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1991).
" See In re Dobson, 212 A.2d 620 (Vt. 1965); State v. Ovitt, 268 A.2d 916 (Vt.
1970); In re J.V., 464 N.W.2d. 887 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
"' See In re Apel, 409 N.Y.S.2d 928, 930 (Fain. Ct. 1978).
.21 See In re J.P.B., 419 N.W.2d 387 (Iowa 1988) (person-in-need-of-supervision);
In re Marriage of Rolfe, 699 P.2d 79 (Mont. 1985) (divorce action); In re Barnthouse,
765 P.2d 610 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (divorce action); In re Marriage of Kramer, 580
P.2d 439 (Mont. 1978) (divorce action); In re Jennifer G., 487 N.Y.S.2d 864 (App. Div.
1985) (abuse/neglect proceeding); In re Peter "WV", 565 N.Y.S.2d 271 (App. Div.
1991) (person-in-need-of-supervision); In re Tina "PP", 591 N.Y.S.2d 84 (App. Div.
1992) (person-in-need-of-supervision); Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub.
Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 640 (1979) (commitment
proceeding).
2 In re J.P.B., 419 N.W.2d at 392 (Iowa 1988).
' Id. at 391.
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children involved were not yet mature enough to determine with
whom they should be placed.24
The "best interest" approach has also been followed in
divorce/custody actions. 121 In a case involving two children, ten and
fourteen years old, the Montana Supreme Court detailed the proper
role of an attorney in a custody action. 126 The court referred to § 40-
4-205 of the Montana Code, which states in relevant part, "[t]he
court may appoint an attorney to represent the interests of a minor
dependent child with respect to his support, custody, and
visitation. "127 The court determined that the word "interest" in this
statute referred to "the child's best interests, not the child's
wishes. " 128 Although the attorney in this case was not an appointed
guardian ad litem, the court found that given the immaturity of the
clients and the pressures that exist in a divorce situation, it would be
in the best interests of the children if the traditional lawyer-client
relationship was modified. 129 The court cautioned that the attorney
who concluded that a child's expressed wishes were not in his best
interests had a duty to inform the court of the child's wishes and the
attorney's basis for the conclusion that the child's desire to live with
a particular parent was not in the child's best interest.13
In a divorce related custody matter a Colorado appellate court
made an identical conclusion about the role of an attorney
representing three siblings."' In In re Barnthouse, 3 2 the court held
that a father's contention that his children's attorney should have
followed their wishes was without merit."3 This court referred to §
14-10-116 of the Colorado Statutes which states that in a divorce
124 Id.
'2 See In re Marriage of Rolfe, 699 P.2d 79 (Mont. 1985); In re Barnthouse, 765
P.2d 610 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); In re Marriage of Kramer, 580 P.2d 439 (Mont. 1978).
'+ In re Marriage of Rolfe, 699 P.2d at 85-87.
I2 d. at 86 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-205 (1979)) (emphasis added).
2 Id. The court did not state how it came to the conclusion that the word
"interests" referred to a child's best interests and not the child's wishes.
"2 Id. The court indicated that an attorney in this situation should assume the role
of a guardian ad litem and represent the child's best interests.
I30 d. at 87.
m In re Barnthouse, 765 P.2d 610 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988)
132 Id.
"3 Id. at 612.
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action a court may appoint an attorney "to represent the interests of
a . . .child with respect to his custody, support, and visitation. " 134
The court interpreted this statute to mean that an appointed attorney
in a custody dispute has a duty to determine and recommend those
available alternatives which are in the best interests of a child.1 35 The
court advised that an attorney in this situation should represent the
children's interests alone.1 36  An attorney must not take a passive
role, but instead must gather all available evidence as to the child's
best interests. 137  "The attorney is not simply to parrot the child's
expressed wishes. "138 Thus, in representing a child, an attorney must
maintain a higher degree of objectivity than if she was representing
an adult.' 39 Although the attorney in this case was not appointed as
a guardian ad litem, the court said that the attorney's obligations were
similar to those imposed on a guardian ad litem.
141
In an abuse/neglect proceeding and two person-in-need-of-
supervision proceedings, two New York courts have implied that an
attorney has a duty to advocate a disposition that is in a child's best
interest. 141 In In re Jennifer G., a law guardian adopted the position
that her clients should be returned to their mother. 142  The mother,
134 Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-116 (1987) (emphasis added).
135 Id.
" In re Barnthouse, 765 P.2d at 612.
137 Id.
" Id. (citing In re Marriage of Kramer, 580 P.2d 439 (Mont. 1978)).
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 See In re Jennifer G., 487 N.Y.S.2d 864 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1985); In re Peter
WV", 565 N.Y.S.2d 271 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1991); In re Tina PP, 591 N.Y.S.2d 84
(App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992). But cf. In re Sandra "XX", 565 N.Y.S.2d 269 (App. Div.
3d Dept. 1991). In this decision, issued the same day as In re Peter "W", the Third
Department found that a law guardian should have advocated for the needs and wishes
of a child client able to make fundamental case handling decisions. Id. at 271.
142 In re Jennifer G., 487 N.Y.S.2d 864 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1985). The Juvenile
Rights Division of the Legal Aid Society in New York took a strong stand against the
Appellate Division's holding in In re Jennifer G. in a practice note issued by the
Division. JRD maintains "that the Court's action constituted a significant departure from
legal principles regarding protection of the attorney-client relationship, thus chilling the
independence of the bar by undercutting the ability of attorneys to appropriately
represent their clients." Janet R. Fink, Practice Note: In the Matter of Jennifer
G.-Maintaining the Integrity of the Law Guardian-Client Relationship (unpublished
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who had admitted beating her children, was found by two social
workers to be making substantial progress.1 43 She had also attended
guidance and training programs.'44 The Second Department required
the appointment of a new law guardian because according to the
court, the law guardian had not acted in the best interests of the
child. 145
In In re Peter "W", the appellate court held that while a law
guardian normally has a duty to advocate for a child's needs and
wishes, 46 the child in this case was not denied effective assistance of
counsel when his law guardian acknowledged that there was a conflict
between his client's wishes and what he determined to be his client's
need for the "structure and resources available in placement. ,147 The
court found that "in light of the Law Guardian's otherwise strong
advocacy on respondent's behalf, his failure to urge an alternative
disposition unsupported by the evidence does not establish that
respondent was denied the effective assistance of counsel. ,148 The
court justified this decision by pointing to the fact that there was no
evidence in the record that would have supported a less restrictive
alternative disposition. 149
Almost two years later another appellate division again found
that a law guardian did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel
to a child client when the guardian acknowledged a conflict between
the child's desire to go home and the law guardian's belief that the
family court "should also take into consideration [respondent's] age
[15 years] and the material in the Probation Investigation. "15 The
law guardian in this case failed to vigorously advocate an alternative
to placement with the County Department of Social Services. 151 Once
memorandum prepared for the New York Legal Aid Juvenile Rights Division) (on file
with author).
143 In re Jennifer G., 487 N.Y.S.2d 864 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1985).
144 Id.
145 Id.
"4 In re Peter "W", 565 N.Y.S.2d 271, 273 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1991).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
0 In re Tina "PP", 591 N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992).
"' Id.
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again, the Third Department justified its holding with the comment
that there was nothing in the record that could realistically support a
less restrictive alternative than the one favored by the court.
1 52
A federal court has also found that an attorney representing
a juvenile has a duty to advocate for the child's best interests."' That
case involved a challenge to the validity of Pennsylvania statutes and
regulations governing the voluntary commitment of mentally ill and
mentally retarded juveniles. The court found that juveniles subject
to commitment were entitled to counsel at all significant stages of the
commitment process." This counsel was to have the "sole
responsibility of advancing the child's best interests. "155
B. The "Advocate": Approach in the Courts
Case law also supports the proposition that an attorney serving
as counsel to a minor has a duty to advocate for the expressed wishes
of the child. Courts have held that an attorney must act as a
traditional advocate in a variety of proceedings.156 In holding that an
attorney cannot waive a hearing in connection with the transfer of a
case from juvenile court to district court without first consulting her
minor client, a federal appellate court implied that an attorney must
152 Id.
"' Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30, 43-44,
(E.D. Pa. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 640 (1979). The district court held that children have
a right to be represented by counsel at a precommitment hearing. Id. This counsel
should represent the best interests of the child. Id. at 44, n.47. On appeal, the Supreme
Court never reached the issue of the proper role of counsel, holding instead that due
process did not require an adversary precommitment hearing with counsel. Secretary
of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640, 649 (1979).
" Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. at 43-44.
155 Id. at 44 n.47. The children involved in this proceeding were either mentally ill
or mentally retarded. As such, their capacity to direct their attorneys was questionable.
This may have played a part in the court's decision.
" Haziel v. United States, 404 F.2d 1275, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (hearing to
transfer a case from juvenile court to district court); Fagnoli v. Farber, 481 N.Y.S.2d
784 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1984) (hearing to determine visitation rights); P. v. P., N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 10, 1992, at 29 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (divorce/custody proceeding); Bowman v.
Two, 704 P.2D 140 (Wash. 1985) (petition for alternative residential placement); In re
Elianne M., 601 N.Y.S.2d 481 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1993).
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act in the role of a traditional advocate in a juvenile delinquency
proceeding.15 7 The court here compared the child's right to insist that
a hearing be held with that of an adult's right to determine his own
plea in a criminal court. 151
In holding that a minor has a right to counsel of his own
choosing, courts in New York and Illinois have implied that a minor
has a right to an advocate for his wishes. 1 9 In 1984, a New York
appellate court held that in a family court matter children are entitled
to be represented by counsel of their own choosing." In November
1992, a New York trial court went one step further and allowed the
substitution of counsel where a child had a difference of opinion with
his counsel."s' The court stated that upon a "showing that the
relationship between the child and the court appointed counsel is in
some way tainted ... substitution is permitted." 62 The eleven year
old child in this case complained to the court that he felt
uncomfortable with his attorney and that he felt she had taken actions
he had not authorized.
1 63
In August 1993, a New York appellate court acknowledged
a child's right to counsel of his own choosing in the context of a
neglect proceeding.'"M In In re Elianne M., the First Department
overturned a family court's denial of an application for substitution
of counsel. 65 In this case the fourteen year old child had expressed
a fear that her law guardian would not communicate her wishes to the
court. Based on the child's concern, the child's expression of a lack
of communication and trust, and the child's belief that the law
157 Haziel v. United States, 404 F.2d 1275, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
"s Id. at 1278.
159 See Fargnoli v. Farber, 481 N.Y.S.2d 784 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1984); P. v. P.,
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 10, 1992, at 29 (Sup. Ct. 1992); In re Elianne M., 601 N.Y.S.2d 481
(App. Div. 1st Dept. 1993); Rob Karwath, Girl Raped by Stepdad Granted New Lawyer,
CHm. TRIB., Sept. 5, 1992, at 5.
"6 Fargnoli, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 786 (affirming a denial of the children's motion to
substitute counsel based on a possible conflict of interest because the counsel chosen by
the children had previously represented the children's mother).
"6 P. v. P., N.Y. L.J., Nov. 10, 1992; at 29 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
162 Id.
'o Daniel Wise, Child Wins Right to Counsel, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 9, 1991, at 1.
'6 In re Elianne M. 601 N.Y.S. 2d 481 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1993).
16 Id.
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guardian had been influenced by the child's adoptive mother, the
court permitted substitution of counsel of the child's choosing.'
A similar situation arose in a Juvenile Court in Illinois in
September 1992.167 A thirteen year old girl requested that the court
allow her to change counsel because she felt that the court appointed
attorney was not adequately representing her point of view. 168 The
girl complained that her representative from the Public Guardian's
Office had not vigorously argued for her wish to resume unsupervised
visits with her family, including the stepfather previously convicted
of raping her. 169 Although the girl's lawyer tried to show that the
girl's therapist and others had conspired to manipulate her into
requesting a new lawyer, the judge granted the child's request and
appointed new counsel stating that he would not stand in the way if
the girl wanted another lawyer to represent her.
1 71
C. The "Impartial Investigator" Approach as Followed by the
Courts
In 1978, a New York Family Court took the position that an
attorney representing a child should remain neutral. '71 In In re Apel,
the Commissioner of Social Services moved for an order dismissing
a court appointed law guardian on the ground that the law guardian
was biased in favor of keeping his clients in foster care. 172 The court
denied the motion but found that normally a law guardian, has an
obligation, at least during the dispositional phase of the proceeding,
to assist the court in arriving at a proper disposition. 73 Thus, the
166 Id.
16 Karwath, supra note 159.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 In re Apel, 409 N.Y.S.2d 928, 930 (Fam. Ct. 1978). This case is an example
of the impartial investigator role that an attorney representing a child might play. See
supra part I.C. for a description of the "Impartial Investigator" role.
'72 In re Apel, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
173 Id. at 930.
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court concluded, a law guardian, like a judge, must remain neutral.174
A "meaningful role" for a law guardian in this court's perspective
would be to provide the court with any information concerning the
child's interests that is not provided by the petitioner or respondent
in the action.'
D. The "Law Guardian" Approach: Two Views
1. Courts That Have Followed the "Law Guardian" Approach
In New York, where § 241 of the Family Court Act provides
for the appointment of law guardians "to help protect [children's]
interests and to help them express their wishes to the court,"1"76 some
courts have found that an attorney must advocate not only a child's
needs but also his wishes.
177
In In re Sandra "XX", the appellate division remitted a case
to family court after finding that the record revealed a child's law
guardian did not play an active role in ensuring her client's rights to
alternative placements in a person-in-need-of-supervision
proceeding. 78  The court stated that "the law guardian should
advocate for the needs and wishes of the child he or she represents
if the child is of sufficient maturity 'to make reasoned decisions about
how the case will be handled. '1"79 The child in this case had an I.Q.
of 100 and was in ninth grade although records revealed that she had
been administratively promoted. 80 The court cited to Douglas J.
'7" Id. at 931. The court found that the law guardian in question did not act
improperly when he advocated the continuation of foster care for his clients. The law
guardian in this case had represented the children in question for more than five years.
The court felt that at some point in extended litigation the law guardian had the right to
advocate the opinion he had formed. Id.
175 Id.
176 N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 241 (McKinney 1992).
' See In re Sandra "XX", 565 N.Y.S.2d 269, 271 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1991); In
re Dewey S., 573 N.Y.S.2d 769, 770 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1991).
'7 In re Sandra "XX", 565 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
I7 d. (citing N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 241, cmt. (McKinney 1992)) (emphasis added).
180 Id. at 270.
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Besharov's Practice Commentary in McKinney's Consolidated Laws
of New York to show that "an adolescent alleged to be a juvenile
delinquent or a person-in-need-of-supervision will presumably be able
to make the fundamental case handling decisions."1"'
The second department of the appellate division also detailed
the role of the law guardian in the case of In re Dewey S. '82 Dewey
S. was an infant in a neglect proceeding that was removed from his
home and placed in foster care.' 83 After he had been in their home
for two years, Dewey's foster parent's moved to discharge his law
guardian when the guardian sought to move Dewey to the care of a
maternal aunt.' The appellate division overturned the family court's
dismissal of the law guardian stating that there was no conflict of
interest involved in her actions."8 5 The court stated that a law
guardian's proper role in a child protective proceeding "not only
includes serving as counsel and advocate for the child, but also
encompasses aiding the court in arriving at an appropriate
disposition. "186 As such, a law guardian may present to a court "that
position which, in the law guardian's judgment, would best promote
the child's interest. "187
2. Courts That Have Found the "Law Guardian" Approach to
Involve an Inherent Conflict of Interest
Although case law exists in New York that implies that an
attorney should play a role that is part advocate and part guardian ad
litem, case law in other states urges that one attorney cannot fill both
of these roles because of an inherent conflict of interest.188 The
Supreme Court of Vermont has repeatedly stated this since 1965. In
181 Id. at 271 (citing N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 241, cmt. (McKinney 1992)).
"~ In re Dewey S., 573 N.Y.S.2d 769 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1991).
183 Id.
18 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
"s In re Dewey S., 573 N.Y.S.2d at 770.
' See In re Dobson, 212 A.2d 620, 622 (Vt. 1965); State v. Ovitt, 268 A.2d 916,
918 (Vt. 1970); In re J.V., 464 N.W.2d. 887, 892 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
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In re Dobson,' 9 the court overruled its previous position in In re
Moses,"' and found that whenever a minor is charged with a crime
in any court a guardian ad litem should be appointed. 9' The court
reasoned that an attorney can effectively argue alternative strategies
only to a client capable of making a discriminating choice." A
minor, the court held, "is presumed incapable and under disability,
hence the need of a guardian ad litem to weigh alternatives for
him." 93 The court further reasoned that a lawyer could not serve as
both a guardian ad litem and as counsel because she would be in
effect acting as both attorney and client.)" This would be a detriment
to both positions and could potentially jeopardize the client's
interests.' 95 Minors, the court concluded, are best represented by a
"separation of the roles of guardian ad litem and attorney."1 96
Five years later, in State v. Ovitt, 97 the Vermont Supreme
Court cited its decision in Dobson in the case of a teenager convicted
of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway with defective
equipment."" This court held that a guardian ad litem could not
properly fulfill the role of guardian ad litem and legal counsel.' 99 In
this case, the trial court refused the minor's request that his brother,
who was his guardian ad litem, be allowed to act as his counsel.2"
Though this refusal was based in part on the fact that the brother in
question was not an attorney, the court referred to Dobson20 ' to show
t 212 A.2d 620 (Vt. 1965).
190 163 A.2d 868 (Vt. 1960) (finding competency to waive counsel in a
knowledgeable minor verging on adulthood).
191 In re Dobson, 212 A.2d at 622.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
"9 In re Dobson, 212 A.2d at 622.
1'7 268 A.2d 916 (Vt. 1970).
1' Id. at 918.
199 Id.
W Id.
21 In re Dobson, 212 A.2d at 622.
1993] KIDS ARE PEOPLE TOO 231
that a quandary exists when one person attempts to fill these two
roles. 202
The necessary separation of the roles of guardian ad litem and
legal counsel has also been emphasized in a child in need of
supervision proceeding.0 3 In In re J. V., an Iowa court of appeals
took a strong stand against what the court viewed as a reluctance by
the bench and bar to provide for a separate guardian ad litem and
legal counsel in many cases. 2° The court attributed this reluctance
to appoint separate counsel to the "most insidious of reasons," namely
the fact that "a person performing two functions may be entitled to
more compensation than a person performing one. ,
2 5
V. Standards Set By Practitioners For Attorneys Representing A
Child-Client
An attorney looking for further clarification of her duty to her
child-client might look to standards set by others in the field. One
such set of standards is the Practice Manual for Law Guardians
distributed to new attorneys in the Juvenile Rights Division of the
Legal Aid Society in New York City.
21
This manual relies heavily on The Lawyer's Code of
Professional Responsibility for guidance. 2 7  Based on ethical
considerations, it concludes that all children have a right to expect
their law guardian to communicate their wishes to the court and to
take those wishes into account when deciding upon an appropriate
202 State v. Ovitt, 268 A.2d 916, 918; see State v. Barrette, 571 A.2d 1137, 1139
(Vt. 1990) (advising the appointment of a guardian ad litem in order to avoid the
conflicts that may arise when a minor's attorney takes on two roles).
In re J.V., 464 N.W.2d. 887 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
I d. at 892. The court's view here was dictum. The court was considering the
question of whether the children's guardian ad litem, who was also the children's
attorney, had provided effective counsel. The court discussed what it felt was a
necessary separation of the roles of guardian ad litem and legal counsel in the context
of what duties it felt where in the proper province of a guardian ad litem. See id.
m Id. at 892-93.
206 Michael R. Gale ed., Practice Manual for Law Guardians, Legal Aid Society of
New York, Juvenile Rights Division (1993)[hereinafter Practice Manual].
"7 Id. at 253-254.
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course of action. 2 8 It further states that an older, more intelligent,
and more mature child should have more impact on his law
guardian's decisions.2 9 When a child is sufficiently mature, the
Legal Aid Society advises that a law guardian should advocate for the
result the child desires.210
This manual also discusses how a law guardian can best
determine if a particular child's level of maturity justifies giving the
child control over the decision-making in his case.2" It concludes
that the best approach is to make determinations on a case by case
basis.2"2 While no rigid guidelines for determining a child's maturity
are given, 1 3 the law guardian is cautioned that she may take into
account "any serious lack of judgment and good sense which inheres
in the child's decisions."2"4 She is further advised that when a mature
child wants her to advocate a position which she believes is unwise,
she should act as an advisor and attempt to persuade the child to
change his position. This approach is particularly advised in cases
where the child wants his law guardian to advocate a position that
may place him in danger. The manual cites to the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer "should advise
the client of the possible effect of each legal alternative" and may
"emphasize the possibility of harsh consequences that might result
from assertion of legally permissible positions. 
2 5
2N Id. at 254.
2 Id. at 255.
210 Id.
211 Practice Manual, supra note 206, at 257-58.
212 Id. at 257.
23 While the current Legal Aid manual offers no specific guidelines, the prior
version of this manual provided that the child should determine which interests are
paramount in all cases in which "the attorney is satisfied, after full disclosure and
discussion with the client, that the client understands the proceeding, the alternatives
available to the court, the consequences and risks to the client, and further, that the
client possesses sufficient maturity to weigh these factors with a reasonable degree of
dispassion and objectivity . . . ." Jonathan S. Dick et al., (Michael R. Gale ed.),
Practice Manual for Law Guardians in the Family Court of the State of New York,
Legal Aid Society, Juvenile Rights Division (1976).
214 Practice Manual, supra note 206, at 258.
211 Id. at 257 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8).
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VI. The Impact of the Child's Age on his Attorney's Role
If an attorney views her role as being that of the "champion",
then she will argue for a child's best interests, whether that child is
two or seventeen. If the attorney is fulfilling the role of the
"impartial investigator" she will have an unwavering commitment to
present all facts to the court and will be similarly unaffected by
differences in the child's age. But what of the attorney who views
her role as that of the "advocate" or "law guardian"; does her
commitment to her client differ according to the child's age?2 6
A five year old child may be capable of vocalizing his wishes,
but are they sufficiently mature enough views for an attorney to argue
in court? And what of the infant who is incapable of expressing any
opinion? Whose views should the attorney appointed as counsel to
such a child represent?" 7
A law guardian has a duty to represent both a child's needs
and wishes, and as such, it could be argued that her duty to give
preference to her client's wishes varies according to her client's age.
A law guardian's responsibility to her client can thus be viewed as a
sliding scale, the more mature the client, the more weight is given to
216 While this section takes the position that an attorney's duties to a child client will
vary when the child is very young, an in depth discussion of how to determine at exactly
what age children should be allowed to determine their legal interests is a subject of
much debate and is beyond the scope of this note. Chronological cutoffs have been
suggested as a simple procedural way to establish a right to direct counsel. This
approach, however, ignores the reality that not all children mature at the same rate. See
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRINO, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 127 (1982);
cf. Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation of the Child in Protection Proceedings. The
Determination of Decision-Making Capacity, 17 FAM. L.Q. 287, 320 (1983)
(recommending a presumption in protection proceedings that children seven years and
older are capable of decisionmaking). Maturity tests have also been suggested as a way
to determine a child's ability to instruct counsel. These tests could potentially be
administered by either the attorney or the court. One such test is the IJA-ABA's
standard of "considered judgment." UA-ABA STANDARDS, supra note 65, at 81.
Another approach would be to establish a presumption that children of a certain age are
capable of decisionmaking.
217 But cf. RICHARD E. FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS (1974); JOHN HOLT, ESCAPE FROM
CHILDHOOD (1984) (arguing that birth itself confers on a child the moral right to make
decisions for himself).
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the child's preferences." 8 Obviously, this may at times present the
law guardian with some difficult dilemmas that most likely will be
resolved by giving preference to what the law guardian, not the child,
views as most important.
But what of the "advocate?" Her duty to her client is to
advocate the child's views, not to determine them. Even among
authorities who agree that a mature minor is entitled to an advocate,
there is much disagreement as to what role, if any, counsel assigned
to an immature minor should play.21 9
One solution to the problem of a client incapable of
instructing his attorney is for the attorney to request the appointment
of a guardian ad litem. 22" The attorney will then advocate for her
client's views as espoused by the guardian. 21  An advantage of this
solution is that it allows an attorney to maintain the position of
advocate. However, a disadvantage is that the guardian's decisions
may be arbitrary and counsel will be obligated to argue them
nonetheless.222
Another possible solution to the problem of representing a
very young client is for the attorney acting as an advocate to use the
doctrine of substituted judgment to determine the views of her
client.223 An attorney in this position would attempt to formulate a
position based on what the child-client would advocate if he were able
to sufficiently comprehend the situation and vocalize his opinions.224
21" This view is in accord with the New York State Bar Association Law Guardian
Representation Standards which state that in the case of a young child, "the mixture of
wishes and interests [advocated by the law guardian] depends in large part on the child's
age, maturity, and capacity." 1988 LAW GUARDIAN STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 126,
167. The view expressed by the Legal Aid Society of New York, however, differs in
that a law guardian representing an immature minor is instructed not to advocate an
outcome but merely to present all relevant information and inform the court of the
child's expressed wishes. Practice Manual, supra note 206, at 156.
219 See infra text accompanying notes 220-233.
22 IJA-ABA STANDARDS, supra note 65, at § 3.1(b)(ii)[c][2].
221 Id. at § 3.1(b)(ii)[c][21.
m See generally Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 94 (arguing that courts should
hesitate before appointing guardians ad litem in cases where the best interests of the child
are not obvious).
' Robyn-Marie Lyon, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for
Minors, 75 CAL. L. REV. 681, 702 (1987).
4 See id. at 702.
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In formulating this position, the attorney would consider any
information obtainable from the child :as to his interests, as well as
the opinions of individuals who know the child and can form
conclusions as to what the child desires.225 The attorney would also
consult with other more mature children who at one time were
similarly situated to the child in question.226 In effect the attorney
would determine "what choices a competent person with the
characteristics, tastes, preferences, history and prospects of the
incompetent would make to maximize his interests or wants-both
those he presently has and those he is likely to have in the future. ,227
The advantage of this approach is that if properly enacted it
would enable an attorney to advocate not what the attorney thinks is
best or what she thinks the child would want, but what the particular
child, if mature, would want. 228  The reality of this approach,
however, is questionable. Commentators have criticized the
substituted judgment doctrine, arguing that an attorney using this
approach to make decisions for her client is really just deciding what
she wants to do with her client not what her client would want to do
if he were competent to decide for himself.229 Arguably, an attorney
who uses the substituted judgment doctrine to determine her client's
wishes is introducing one more element of arbitrariness into the
system. While it sounds logical enough, one must question whether
anyone can predict what a particular child would want if only he were
more mature. After all, part of the process of maturing involves
growing and changing. How a particular child will turn out is nearly
impossible to predict. A farmer can estimate the quantity and quality
of her next season's crop based on those of years past, but this
estimate can be radically altered by an unpredicted drought or
hurricane. The same holds true for a child. We can generalize, but
we cannot ascertain what a child will be like or what a child will
2 Id. at 703.
m Id. at 705.
227 John A. Robertson, Organ Donations By Incompetents and the Substituted
Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 48, 65 (1976).
Lyon, supra note 223, at 702.
229 See, e.g., Kevin W. Bates, Live or Let Die; Who Decides an Incompetent's Fate?
In re Storar and In re Eichner, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REv. 387, 392.
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desire when so many unpredictable factors play a part in shaping who
he will be and how he will think.
Finally, it has been suggested that if a child is too young to
formulate a position, then the child should not have legal counsel.23 °
In an article focusing on legal representation for young children,
Professor Martin Guggenheim argues that children under the age of
seven should not normally be given legal counsel. 3 Guggenheim
concludes that a lawyer cannot represent a young child and yet still
be a lawyer.232 Though this suggestion does eliminate the potential
for the arbitrary decisions possible with the two previous suggestions
it does run contrary to the notion that children of any age are entitled
to independent representation in many court proceedings.233
In sum, if an attorney is acting as a law guardian or as an
advocate, her role will differ if her client is of a very young age.
The attorney acting as a law guardian will give less weight to a young
child's wishes. As for the attorney acting as an advocate, the
preferable solution would be for the attorney to request the
appointment of a guardian ad litem and for the attorney to take her
directions from this individual.
VII. Conclusions and Recommendations
Realistically, in the majority of cases an attorney representing
a child will never face the dilemma of having to determine her proper
role. In delinquency or person-in-need-of-supervision proceedings a
liberty interest is at stake, and as such a child should be treated no
differently than an adult.234 In these proceedings an attorney should
o Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 154. This suggestion does not preclude a child
having a guardian ad litem.
23' Id. at 91. While Professor Guggenheim has chosen the age of seven based on the
fact that children under this age cannot be prosecuted for delinquency in most
jurisdictions, he points out that the exact age and the method of determining that age are
not essential parts of his argument. Id. at 78 n.4.
232 Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 154.
See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
Interview with Laura Cohen, Assistant Director of Training, Juvenile Rights
Division, Legal Aid Society of New York in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 18, 1993); see IJA-
ABA Standards, supra note 65, at § 3.1(b)(ii)[a].
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act as an advocate regardless of her client's age or her status as a law
guardian or counsel. 2" In other types of proceedings, if the child's
parents are completely disinterested parties they will have the
authority to direct the child's attorney.236 It is only in situations
where a child's parents have been disqualified from their roles as
substitute decisionmakers that conflicts about an attorney's proper
role are likely to arise.237 But, even in these situations, a child and
his attorney will often agree on the course litigation should follow.
Difficulties arise for an attorney only in situations where there is an
actual or potential conflict over the course of action the attorney
should pursue on behalf of her client.
Despite the fact that conflicts rarely arise, it is important for
an attorney with a child-client to clarify her role at the outset. A
review of the statute, court rule, or order appointing the attorney
should be the first step in clarifying this position.238 An attorney
should ascertain from these sources whether she has been appointed
as legal counsel, a law guardian or as a guardian ad litem. 39 If the
appointment is not clear, the attorney should immediately request
judicial clarification.24
If the attorney has been appointed as a guardian ad litem, she
has a clearly defined role. She must act to further the "best interests
of the child. "24 It should be noted, however, that the attorney acting
in this capacity is not acting as legal counsel.
If the attorney has been appointed as a law guardian or as
legal counsel her role may not be as clear. Statutes are unclear as to
the exact role an attorney placed in one of these positions should
play.24 2 Case law on the subject varies widely. 3 However, ethics
2 Id. ; see Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 86-87.
Parents are most likely to be disinterested parties in tort or contract actions. See
generally Cline, supra note 7.
237 See Cline, supra note 7, at 684-85.
3 See Robert M. Horowitz & Howard A. Davidson, Tough Decisions for the Tender
Years, 10 FAM. ADvoC. 9, 11 (1988).
239 See id.
24 Cf. id. (recommending that as a matter of practice all attorneys should routinely
request judicial instruction as to their appropriate role).
241 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.045 (WEST 1991).
242 See supra part III.
243 See supra part IV.
AAm
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codes and bar association standards tend to favor the advocate
approach, at least, in the case of a mature child. 2'
When a child is mature enough to be capable of considered
judgment, that is, he is mature enough to understand, with advice of
counsel, at least the general nature of the proceedings, 245 an attorney
acting as his law guardian or his legal counsel has an ethical
obligation to abide by this child's wishes.24 An attorney may counsel
a client she feels is advocating an unwise option, but the final
decision should be left to the client. 7 An attorney who follows this
course of action will preserve her ethical responsibility to her client 4 8
and will ensure that her client's voice is heard in court.
249 It will
then properly be for the court, and not the attorney, to decide what
is best for the child.250
When a child is not mature enough to make a "considered
judgment" an attorney's responsibilities may differ according to
whether she has been appointed as a law guardian or as legal counsel.
If an attorney has been appointed as a law guardian, her defined
statutory responsibility is two-fold.25' She must be an advocate for
her client's interests and she must express her client's wishes. 52
Because of this dual responsibility, a law guardian with an immature
client must advocate what she believes to be in the child's best
interests.253 She should, however, inform the court of the child's
wishes if they are in conflict with the position she is advocating.
If an attorney has been appointed as legal counsel to a child
too young to be capable of considered judgment she has several
options. 25 Requesting the appointment of a guardian ad litem would
2A4 See supra part II.
245 See supra part II.A.
246 See supra part II.
247 See MODEL CODE, supra note 33, at EC 7-8, EC 7-7.
248 See supra part I.
9 See Yudes, supra note 31, at 15.
2 See Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 138.
t See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 241 (McKinney 1992).
252 id.
211 See id.
' See supra notes 220-233 and accompanying text.
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appear to be the best solution.2 55 In this instance the attorney would
avoid confusion and any inference of impropriety by taking direction
from an independent person that has been expressly appointed to
protect the interests of the child.256
Angela D. Lurie
255 See IJA-ABA STANDARDS, supra note 65 at § 3. l(b)(ii)[c][2] (recommending that
if a child not capable of "considered judgment" and does not have a guardian ad litem,
his attorney should seek to have one appointed); see also Sobie, supra note 57.
2 Sobie, supra note 57.

